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Abstract
This article examines a two-stage model of asymmetric conﬂict based on the classic
Colonel Blotto game in which players have, in the ﬁrst stage, the ability to increase
the number of battleﬁelds contested. It thereby endogenizes the “dimensionality” of
conﬂict. In equilibrium, if the asymmetry in the players’ resource endowments exceeds
a threshold, the weak player chooses to add battleﬁelds, while the strong player never
does. Adding battleﬁelds spreads the strong player’s forces more thinly, increasing the
incidence of favorable strategic mismatches for the weak player.
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11 Introduction
Conﬂict often takes place across multiple component contests or “battleﬁelds.” In this article
we consider a two-player, two-stage game in which players start with a ﬁxed endowment of a
resource and a given number of battleﬁelds. In the ﬁrst stage, the players have the ability to
simultaneously create additional battleﬁelds. In the second stage they allocate their respec-
tive stocks of the resource across the updated set of battleﬁelds in order to maximize the
expected proportion of the individual component contests won. We are therefore concerned
with the endogeneity of the number of battleﬁelds, or the “dimensionality” of the conﬂict.
The battleﬁelds in this game may be taken literally to be points of combat or fronts of
a military campaign, where opening up a new battleﬁeld means expanding the geographical
scope of the conﬂict. Or they may refer to collections of targets within a transportation or
computer network in the context of counter-terrorism or information systems security eﬀorts.
In sports contests, battleﬁelds may be interpreted as the individual player contests within
the overall match, such as a cornerback trying to “lock down” a receiver in American football,
a defender marking a striker in football, or any of the ﬁve individual one-on-one matchups
in basketball. Alternatively, they may be interpreted as the clash between distinct skill
sets within the overall match, such as passing versus pass defense in American football or
left-handed pitching versus left-handed hitting in baseball.
It is also possible to interpret the number of component contests or battleﬁelds within a
conﬂict more directly as the diﬀerent dimensions of the conﬂict. For instance, when ﬁrms
compete in a market for a bundled good that has multiple patentable components, one might
interpret the race to patent a given component as a dimension of the conﬂict. Similarly, polit-
ical campaigns involve multiple issues and multiple segments of voters. Winning the contest
over each of these issues or segments may be viewed as succeeding in a given dimension of
the contest.
2To examine the issue of the endogeneity of the number of battleﬁelds or dimensionality
of a conﬂict, we augment the classic Colonel Blotto game of Borel (1921) to allow for a pre-
conﬂict stage in which players have the ability to increase the dimensionality of the conﬂict.
The Colonel Blotto game is a foundational model of conﬂict with multiple component contests
and was one of the ﬁrst problems examined in modern game theory.1 In this game, two players
simultaneously allocate their respective endowments of a resource across a ﬁnite number, n,
of battleﬁelds. In each battleﬁeld, the player with the higher level of resources wins the
battle, and each player maximizes the proportion of the battleﬁelds that he wins.2 Consider
for example, a simple version of the game in which two symmetric players each have 1 unit
of force to allocate across three battleﬁelds. In this simple example, a pure strategy is a
three-tuple of nonnegative numbers (x1,x2,x3) such that x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1.
It is well-known that the Colonel Blotto game is a constant-sum game which, for initial
resource endowments that are not too asymmetric, has no pure-strategy equilibria. Unless
one player has a suﬃcient endowment of the resource to allocate an amount greater than or
equal to the other player’s endowment to each battleﬁeld, equilibrium requires nondegenerate
mixed strategies. These mixed strategies are n-variate distributions, one dimension for each
battleﬁeld.
When players have identical endowments, the fact that the Colonel Blotto game is
constant-sum ensures that payoﬀs are identical, regardless of the number of battleﬁelds.
Our focus in this article is on conﬂicts in which players are asymmetrically endowed. There
is a strong player, S, whose endowment of the resource is larger than that of the weak player,
1The Colonel Blotto game is an example of a multidimensional contest with linkages, where the linkages
arise from the fact that if a player uses all of his endowment of the resource then an increase in his allocation
of the resource to any one of the component contests requires a decrease in the resource allocated to one or
more of the other contests. There are a number of related environments in which overall performance is a
function of the outcomes in each of a set of component contests. For a survey of multidimensional contests
with linkages see Kovenock and Roberson (2010).
2An alternative objective is for each player to maximize the probability that he wins a majority of the
battleﬁelds. For n > 3, the solution for the majority objective game is still an open question.
3W.
In the context of the two-stage game described above, we demonstrate that given a
suﬃciently small initial number of battleﬁelds and cost of adding battleﬁelds, and given
suﬃciently asymmetric endowments of the resource (but not necessarily in the range of pa-
rameters leading to a pure-strategy equilibrium in the Colonel Blotto game), in any subgame
perfect equilibrium the weak player W optimally chooses to add battleﬁelds, whereas the
strong player S abstains. Moreover, we characterize the optimal number of battleﬁelds for
the weak player to add.
The logic underlying our result is straightforward. Because the resources in the Colonel
Blotto game are use-it-or-lose-it, conﬂicts with a small number of battleﬁelds force the play-
ers to go toe-to-toe and directly compete strength-versus-strength. Because the strong player
has the larger endowment, this means that when the conﬂict is focused on a small number
of battleﬁelds, the strong player is at a clear advantage. In the trivial case of one battleﬁeld,
or when the number of battleﬁelds is suﬃciently small that the strong player has a suﬃcient
endowment of the resource to allocate an amount greater than or equal to the weak player’s
endowment to each battleﬁeld, the strong player wins with certainty. As the number of bat-
tleﬁelds increases and becomes suﬃciently large that the strong player does not win every
battleﬁeld with certainty, this advantage persists even though equilibrium is in nondegen-
erate mixed strategies. For an initial range of parameters for which mixed strategies arise,
the strong player employs a joint distribution with identical marginal distributions across
the battleﬁelds which on average allocate a larger amount to each battleﬁeld than the weak
player. Moreover, the strong player allocates an amount equal to the weak player’s budget
to a fraction of the battleﬁelds. As the number of battleﬁelds increases further, the strong
player no longer has suﬃcient resources to ﬁnd it optimal to allocate an amount equal to
the weak player’s budget to a subset of battleﬁelds and employs an n-variate distribution
which randomizes uniformly in each battleﬁeld with a common support. The upper bound
4of this support, the highest single equilibrium allocation of either player to each battleﬁeld,
is decreasing in the number of battleﬁelds. Over this range the weak player’s equilibrium
strategy takes a special form: the weak player stochastically neglects a proportion of the
battleﬁelds (in expectation equal to one minus the ratio of his endowment to the strong
player’s endowment), placing none of the resource in some battleﬁelds with positive prob-
ability, while randomly allocating positive levels of the resource to a subset of battleﬁelds
in magnitudes that are comparable in expectation to the random allocations of his rival.
Following Roberson (2006) we call this a “stochastic guerilla warfare” strategy.
As this description implies, by adding battleﬁelds, the weak player forces the strong player
to allocate resources more thinly, thereby weakening the strong player’s relative advantage.
In other words, underdogs who increase the number of battleﬁelds have a better chance of
an upset.
In asymmetric conﬂicts, by forcing the strong player to spread his resources more thinly,
the weak player increases the incidence of favorable mismatches, in which the weak player,
despite his overall disadvantage, is in an advantageous position within a given battleﬁeld.
Note that, in equilibrium, each player attempts to strategically allocate resources to maxi-
mize the proportion of battleﬁelds won, creating strategic matches or mismatches of resources
as conforms to this objective. With a large number of battleﬁelds the net outcome of this
behavior is that the weak player on average stochastically allocates resources to a propor-
tion of the set of battleﬁelds equal to the ratio of the weak and strong endowments and
neglects the remaining battleﬁelds. In those battleﬁelds in which the weak player is active,
he on average allocates the same level of the resource as the stronger player. The strong
player, in turn, randomizes by allocating positive amounts to all battleﬁelds, treating each
symmetrically but satisfying his resource constraint with probability one.
Other well-known constant-sum games in which players attempt to achieve favorable mis-
matches include Matching Pennies and Rock-Paper-Scissors. Like the Colonel Blotto game,
5equilibrium in these games requires nondegenerate mixed strategies. However, the mismatch
incentives in the Colonel Blotto game are quite diﬀerent from those arising in Matching
Pennies or Rock-Paper-Scissors and are somewhat more complicated. In the Colonel Blotto
game, because of the feasibility constraint on resource allocations imposed by the endow-
ment, in the range in which equilibrium is in mixed strategies each player would like to
win each battleﬁeld that he wins by barely winning and lose each battleﬁeld that he loses
by a large margin (thereby assuring that he has more or his rival has less to allocate else-
where). Indeed, these oﬀsetting incentives are the source of the instability that leads to
the requirement of mixed equilibrium strategies. In asymmetric conﬂicts, these incentives
are also the source of the nature of the weak player’s equilibrium strategies, when they are
uniquely determined. Because the weak player is at a disadvantage, competing toe-to-toe
in every battleﬁeld requires stochastically allocating a lower level of the resource to each
battleﬁeld. This however, means a high probability of losing any given contested battleﬁeld,
an outcome that the weak player would rather suﬀer while allocating zero to that battleﬁeld.
As a consequence, the weak player chooses instead to bid aggressively on a randomly chosen
subset of battleﬁelds, competing on those battleﬁelds on equal footing with the stronger
player, while expending zero in the remaining battleﬁelds, in eﬀect conceding them. In turn,
these oﬀsetting incentives cause the strong player to randomize uniformly across a randomly
chosen subset of battleﬁelds and to lock down the remaining battleﬁelds by allocating an
amount equal to the weak player’s endowment to those battleﬁelds.
One article related to our contribution is Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010a).3 This article
examines a single winner-take-all contest for a prize of common and known value in which
each player’s level of resource employed is a one-dimensional output derived from multiple
inputs or activities entered into a Cobb-Douglas production function. The players’ respective
3See also Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010b) which examines a dynamic version of Arbatskaya and Mialon
(2010a).
6outputs are then inserted into a lottery contest success function, so that the probability that
each player wins the prize is the ratio of his output to the sum of the two players’ outputs
(or one-half in the event that both outputs are zero). Players incur constant unit costs of
employing the inputs, which may be asymmetric across both inputs and players. Inputs may
also enter the production function with diﬀerent exponents.
One of the issues examined by Arbatskaya and Mialon is the eﬀect of increasing the
number of inputs. Because the multiple inputs determine an aggregate output variable,
rather than giving rise to an extra component contest, the eﬀects of increasing the number of
inputs or activities in their model is quite diﬀerent from increasing the number of battleﬁelds
in our model. Speciﬁcally, adding an input in the Arbatskaya-Mialon model leads to two
distinct eﬀects. First, it tends to increase the discriminatory power of the contest, leading to
more intense competition and more dissipation of the value of the prize. Second, depending
on the initial strength of each player in the contest and the players’ per unit costs of the
input, adding an input may alter the relative strengths of the players in the overall contest.
Because symmetry in player strengths tends to increase competition, this eﬀect could go
either way, intensifying competition if the addition makes players more symmetric than they
were previously or softening competition if it makes players more asymmetric. None of
these eﬀects involve the basic forces at work in the game we examine where, by forcing the
strong player to spread his resources more thinly across component contests, the weak player
increases the incidence of favorable strategic mismatches.
Also related are issues such as sabotage which can be seen as an additional input in a
one-dimensional aggregate output variable for a single winner-take-all contest. In contests
with sabotage (c.f. Lazear 1989, Konrad 2000, Chen 2003, and M¨ unster 2007) each player’s
aggregate output is a function of his own productive eﬀort and the eﬀort that each of his
rivals expends on sabotaging, or hindering, his output. As in Arbatskaya and Mialon, the
outcome of the contest is determined by the players’ aggregate outputs. In general, stronger
7players, as measured by the cost of eﬀort, are more heavily sabotaged and thus the relative
positions of weaker players improve. The intuition for this result is that at the margin
hindering a stronger opponent increases a player’s odds of winning more than hindering a
weaker opponent. Also related is the issue doping or performance enhancement in contests
(cf. Berentsen 2002, Konrad 2005, and Kr¨ akel 2007). In these studies, each player’s aggregate
output is a function of his productive eﬀort and his investment in doping. Again, in each of
these examples the basic forces at work diﬀer from those forces that we describe above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe
the two-stage game including the pre-conﬂict and conﬂict stages. In section 3 we determine
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs and discuss the implications of the
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To allow for an endogenous number of battleﬁelds, we examine a two-player, two-stage
game that augments the classic Colonel Blotto game by allowing for a pre-conﬂict battleﬁeld
creation stage. Initially, there are a ﬁnite number n0 ≥ 3, of independent battleﬁelds, and
each of the two players has a ﬁxed endowment of a resource (henceforth, available forces or
budget). Let S denote the strong player with budget BS, and W denote the weak player
with budget BW, where BS ≥ BW.
Let the two-stage game with resource endowments (BW,BS) and the initial number of
battleﬁelds n0 be denoted by Γ(BW,BS,n0). We start the description of the model in the
ﬁrst stage.
8Pre-Conﬂict Stage
In the ﬁrst or pre-conﬂict stage both of the players have the opportunity to invest in the
creation of additional battleﬁelds. If player S chooses to create ns new battleﬁelds and player
W chooses to create nw new battleﬁelds, then the number of battleﬁelds changes from the
initial number n0 to the updated number n as follows
n = n0 + ns + nw. (1)
The costs of creating additional battleﬁelds are symmetric and given by the cost function
c : R+ → R+, which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly convex, and continuously
diﬀerentiable on R+. Although each player is restricted to choosing a nonnegative integer
number of battleﬁelds to create, assuming that the cost function is deﬁned over the set of
nonnegative real numbers simpliﬁes the analysis. To ensure an interior equilibrium, we will
also assume that c′(0) = 0. Each of the players is risk neutral and maximizes the expected
proportion of battles won minus the opportunity cost of the funds invested in the creation
of new battleﬁelds.
Conﬂict Stage
In the ﬁnal or conﬂict stage, the two players play a Colonel Blotto game with the updated
number of battleﬁelds. The ﬁnal stage’s Colonel Blotto game is described as follows. The
players simultaneously allocate the resource (henceforth, forces) across the updated (ﬁnite)
number, n ≥ 3, of independent battleﬁelds. Each player has a ﬁxed level of available forces.
In order to keep the total value of the ﬁnal stage’s Colonel Blotto game constant with respect
to changes in the number of battleﬁelds, each player is assumed to maximize the expected
proportion of battleﬁelds won. Thus, the total value of the ﬁnal stage’s Colonel Blotto
game is one, or, equivalently, each battleﬁeld has a common value of (1/n) for each player.
9Let xi denote player i’s n-tuple of force allocations (xi,1,...,xi,j,...,xi,n), which speciﬁes
the allocation of force to each battleﬁeld j. In the case that the players allocate the same
level of force to a particular battleﬁeld, it is assumed that the strong player (S) wins the
battleﬁeld. This speciﬁcation of the tie-breaking rule avoids the need to have the strong
player (S) provide an allocation of force arbitrarily close to, but above, the weak player’s
(W’s) maximal allocation of force. A range of tie-breaking rules yields similar results.
In each battleﬁeld j, let πi,j denote the payoﬀ to player i when he allocates force xi,j and






n if xi,j > x−i,j
0 if xi,j < x−i,j
where ties are handled as described above. Given the updated number of battleﬁelds n and
the force allocation proﬁle (xi,x−i), each player i’s total payoﬀ, denoted by πi, for the two-
stage game Γ(BW,BS,n0) is equal to the proportion of battleﬁelds to which player i allocates






In each battleﬁeld the allocation of force must be nonnegative. For player i, the set of feasible














If the strong player (S) has enough resources (BS) to outbid the weaker player’s (W’s)
maximal force allocation BW on all n battleﬁelds (i.e., if BS ≥ nBW) then there, trivially,
exists a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the strong player (S) wins all of the battleﬁelds. It
10is well known that for the remaining parameter conﬁgurations, (1/n)BS < BW ≤ BS, there
is no pure-strategy equilibrium for this class of games. A mixed strategy, which we term
a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate distribution function Pi : Rn
+ → [0,1]
with support (denoted Supp(Pi)) contained in player i’s set of feasible force allocations Bi
and with the set of one-dimensional marginal distribution functions {Fi,j}n
j=1, one univariate
marginal distribution function for each battleﬁeld j. The n-tuple of player i’s allocation of
force to each of the n battleﬁelds is a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate distribution
function Pi. When players employ mixed local strategies in the second stage, each player’s
objective in the two-stage game is to maximize the expected proportion of battleﬁelds won
minus the opportunity cost of creating new battleﬁelds.
3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Conﬂict Stage
We begin in the ﬁnal conﬂict stage and move back through the game tree to the pre-conﬂict
stage. Theorem 1 summarizes Roberson’s (2006) characterization of the unique equilibrium
payoﬀs in the Colonel Blotto game. Recall that the ﬂoor function ⌊x⌋ provides the largest
integer less than or equal to x, and that the ceiling function ⌈x⌉ provides the smallest integer
greater than or equal to x.
Theorem 1 (Roberson (2006)). Let n denote the updated number of battleﬁelds in a subgame
beginning at the ﬁnal conﬂict stage of the game. The unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the
ﬁnal stage Colonel Blotto game are given as follows:
1. If BW/BS satisﬁes (2/n) < (BW/BS) ≤ 1, then the expected proportion of battleﬁelds
won by the weak player (W) is (BW/2BS) and the expected proportion of battleﬁelds won by
the strong player (S) is 1 − (BW/2BS).
112. If BW/BS satisﬁes (1/(n − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ (2/n), then the expected proportion of
battleﬁelds won by the weak player (W) is (2/n)−(2BS/(n2BW)) and the expected proportion
of battleﬁelds won by the strong player (S) is 1 − (2/n) + (2BS/(n2BW)).
3. If BW/BS satisﬁes (1/n) < (BW/BS) < (1/(n − 1)), then deﬁne m = ⌈(BW/(BS −
BW(n−1)))⌉, and note that 2 ≤ m < ∞. The expected proportion of battleﬁelds won by the
weak player (W) is (2m − 2)/(mn2), and the expected proportion of battleﬁelds won by the
strong player (S) is 1 − (2m − 2)/(mn2).
Theorem 1 follows immediately from Theorems 2, 3, and 5 of Roberson (2006), which
demonstrate the existence of equilibrium, properties of equilibrium univariate marginal dis-
tributions, and the unique equilibrium payoﬀs in the two-payer Colonel Blotto game with
asymmetric budgets. Note that uniqueness of the equilibrium expected proportions of bat-
tleﬁelds won follows immediately from the fact that the Colonel Blotto game is constant
sum.
Before moving on to the pre-conﬂict stage, it is helpful to brieﬂy summarize the nature of
the optimal strategies in the conﬂict stage.4 Beginning with the most asymmetric parameter
range and moving towards symmetric endowments, if BS ≥ nBW then the strong player
can trivially win each of the n battleﬁelds by allocating BW to each battleﬁeld. If (1/n) <
(BW/BS) < (1/(n − 1)), then the weak player utilizes a stochastic guerilla warfare strategy
consisting of a joint distribution function that randomly allocates zero resources to all but
two of the battleﬁelds, and the strong player utilizes a stochastic complete coverage strategy
consisting of a joint distribution function that randomly allocates BW to all but two of the
battleﬁelds. In the two battleﬁelds in which the weaker player competes, he randomizes
over a set of bivariate mass points. Similarly, in the two battleﬁelds which the stronger
player does not lock down by allocating BW, he also randomizes over a set of bivariate mass
4For more information on the equilibrium joint distribution functions see Theorems 2, 3, and 5 of Roberson
(2006).
12points. If (1/(n − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ (2/n), then the weak player continues to randomly
allocate zero resources to all but two battleﬁelds, but on the remaining two battleﬁelds he
now randomizes continuously. The strong player continues to lock down a random subset of
the battleﬁelds with an allocation of BW, but the expected proportion of battleﬁelds that are
locked down is decreasing in the ratio of the weak to strong resource endowments, (BW/BS).
If (2/n) < (BW/BS) ≤ 1, then the weak player continues to randomly allocate zero resources
to a subset of the battleﬁelds, but now the proportion of battleﬁelds that are conceded is
decreasing in the ratio of the weak to strong resource endowments. Over this last range, the
strong player optimally chooses not to lock down any of the battleﬁelds.
Pre-Conﬂict Stage
We now examine the pre-conﬂict stage. We will focus on cases 1 and 2 of Theorem 1. The
analysis for case 3 diﬀers in that both players’ expected proportions of battleﬁelds won have
points of discontinuity, which makes the analysis considerably more complicated. Although
we will not treat case 3 formally in this article, the basic intuition underlying the analysis
in this parameter range is similar to that of case 2.
In the pre-conﬂict stage, each player maximizes his total expected payoﬀ for the game by
choosing a number of new battleﬁelds to create. For each player i = W,S let E(
 n
i=1 πi,j)
denote the proportion of battleﬁelds that player i expects to win given that there are n



















Before stating the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies in stage one, it is helpful
to illustrate how the players’ total expected payoﬀs vary as n increases. The solid curve in
Figure 1 provides the weaker player’s expected proportion of battleﬁelds won as a function
13of BW/BS. In case 3 of Theorem 1 both players’ expected proportions of battleﬁelds won
as a function of BW/BS are step functions, and in Figure 1 the solid curve in the case 3
range runs through the left endpoints of the individual steps. The dashed line in Figure 1
shows how the weak player’s expected proportion of battleﬁelds won increases as the number
of battleﬁelds increases. Because this is a constant-sum game, the strong player’s expected
proportion of battleﬁelds won necessarily decreases as the number of battleﬁelds increases.
Finally, the dotted line in Figure 1 shows the weak player’s maximal expected proportion of
battleﬁelds won as the number of battleﬁelds becomes arbitrarily large.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Observe that in the case 1 parameter range ((2/n) < (BW/BS) ≤ 1) the player’s expected
payoﬀs are linear with respect to (BW/BS). As shown in Figure 1, within the case 1 range the
weak player’s proportion of expected battleﬁelds won is at its maximal level and is invariant
with respect to increases in the number of battleﬁelds. Moving into the case 2 parameter
range ((1/(n − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ (2/n)) both players’ expected proportions of battleﬁelds
won are continuous functions of (BW/BS). As illustrated in Figure 1, as the number of
battleﬁelds increases the boundary between case 1 and case 2 shifts left. As a result the weak
player’s expected proportion of battleﬁelds won increases by ∆E (
 n
i=1 πW,j), and depending
on the cost of creating additional battleﬁelds c( ), the weak player has a potential gain in
his total payoﬀ from increasing the number of battleﬁelds.
Theorem 2. In the pre-conﬂict stage of the game with n0 initial battleﬁelds and resource
endowments BW and BS that satisfy (1/(n0 − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ 1 (i.e., the case 1 and 2
parameter conﬁgurations), the subgame perfect equilibrium stage-game strategies are described
as follows:
1) If BW/BS satisﬁes (2/n0) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ 1, then n∗
s = 0 and n∗
w = 0.
142) If BW/BS satisﬁes (1/(n0 − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) < (2/n0), then n∗
s = 0, and if nw,R ∈
(0,(2BS/BW) − n0) denotes the real number that implicitly solves
−
2
(n0 + nw,R)2 +
4BS




w = ⌊nw,R⌋ if E
 
πw




































Proof. We begin with the strong player. As is clear from the expressions for the stage
payoﬀs in parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 1 and as is illustrated in Figure 1, for all n0, BW, and
BS that satisfy (1/(n0 − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ 1 the strong player’s expected proportion of
battleﬁelds won weakly decreases in n, and therefore the strong player optimally chooses
n∗
s = 0 regardless of the weak player’s choice of nw.
Moving on to the weak player, if n0, BW, and BS satisfy (2/n0) ≤ (BW/BS) ≤ 1 as in
part 1 of Theorem 2, then from part 1 of Theorem 1 and as shown in Figure 1, the expected
proportion of battleﬁelds won is invariant to the number of battleﬁelds for the weak player,
and the weak player optimally chooses n∗
w = 0.
For part 2 of Theorem 2, ((1/(n0 − 1)) ≤ (BW/BS) < (2/n0)), it will be helpful to note
the following. Recalling equation (2) and given that n∗
s = 0, the weak player’s optimization
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Given that initially case 2 of Theorem 1 applies, the weak player’s expected proportion of
5In case 2 c, the weak player may randomize between ⌊nw,R⌋ and ⌈nw,R⌉.
15battleﬁelds won is given by
E



















which, with respect to nw, is continuously diﬀerentiable on R+ and concave. By assumption,
the cost function c( ) is continuously diﬀerentiable on R+ and strictly convex.
We will now show that (i) the weak player’s objective function is strictly concave, (ii)
there exists a unique real number nw,R ∈ (0,(2BS/BW) − n0) that maximizes the weak
player’s objective function, and (iii) given nw,R the weak player’s optimal (discrete) number
of battleﬁelds to create is either ⌈nw,R⌉, or ⌊nw,R⌋, or both.
We begin with point (i), the strict concavity of the weak player’s objective function. In
equation (3), the weak player’s objective function is equal to a concave function minus a
strictly convex function. Thus, the strict concavity of the weak player’s objective function
follows immediately.

















BW(n0)3 > 0, (5)
where the strict inequality holds because in part 2 of Theorem 2 the initial parameters satisfy
(BW/BS) < (2/n0). Similarly, note that from the expression for the expected number of




   nw,R
 
∂nw,R









′(nw,R) < 0. (6)
Combining equations (5) and (6) with the strict concavity of the weak player’s objective
16function, we have shown that there exists a unique real number nw,R ∈ (0,(2BS/BW) − n0)
that maximizes the weak player’s objective function.
Point (iii), that the weak player’s optimal (discrete) number of battleﬁelds to create, n∗
w,
is either or both ⌈nw,R⌉ and ⌊nw,R⌋, follows from the strict concavity of the objective function
over R+. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
When the asymmetry in the players’ initial resource endowments exceeds a threshold
((BW/BS) < (2/n0)), the weaker player chooses to add additional battleﬁelds if the cost is
suﬃciently small. By adding additional battleﬁelds the weaker player forces the stronger
player to spread his resources over a larger number of battleﬁelds. Outside of the pure
strategy range where ((BW/BS) ≤ (1/n0)) the weaker player employs a guerilla warfare
strategy that stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of the battleﬁelds. This remains
true as the number of battleﬁelds increases, but the stronger player’s position is weakened
by the thinning out of his forces.
To obtain some intuition as to the magnitude of this eﬀect, suppose the ratio of the weak
player’s endowment to the strong player’s endowment is 0.12. Then when the initial number
of battleﬁelds n0 satisﬁes n0 ≤ 8, the weak player has no chance of winning any battleﬁeld.
The strong player can simply allocate an amount greater than the weak player’s endowment
to every battleﬁeld and win with certainty. If the weak player increases the number of
battleﬁelds to n = 9, from Theorem 1, part 3, the expected proportion of battleﬁelds won
by the weak player is .016. When n = 10, from Theorem 1, part 2, this proportion increases
to .033. For n ≥ 17, Theorem 1, part 1, gives us .06.
Suppose instead that the ratio of the weak player’s endowment to the strong player’s
endowment is 0.22. When the initial number of battleﬁelds n0 satisﬁes n0 ≤ 4, the weak
player again has no chance of winning any battleﬁeld. If the weak player increases the number
of battleﬁelds to n = 5, from Theorem 1, part 3, the expected proportion of battleﬁelds won
by the weak player is .04. When n = 9, from Theorem 1, part 2, this proportion increases
17to .11, and from Theorem 1, part 1, it remains at that level for n ≥ 10.
In ending, it is important to note that these eﬀects arise from the combination of suﬃ-
ciently asymmetric endowments and the cost eﬀectiveness of expanding the set of battleﬁelds.
The Colonel Blotto game does not as a general rule confer a decisive advantage to the player
with the larger endowment. For instance, when there are three battleﬁelds (n0 = 3) a player
with a 25% higher endowment than his rival wins on average a proportion .6 of the battle-
ﬁelds. The weaker rival wins on average a proportion .4 of the battleﬁelds. That is, despite
the asymmetry in this case, the weak player is able on average to secure slightly more than
one battleﬁeld victory. Moreover, over this range of parameters, since the results in Theorem
2, part 1 apply, there is no incentive for the weak player to expand the number of battleﬁelds
in the contest. Asymmetry by itself is not suﬃcient to justify an endogenous increase in
dimensionality.
4 Conclusion
This article examines a two-stage model of conﬂict based on the classic Colonel Blotto game
with n battleﬁelds. In the ﬁrst stage, each of two resource-constrained players has the
opportunity to incur a cost to increase the number of battleﬁelds that are contested. In
the second stage the players play the resulting Colonel Blotto game with their respective
endowments of the resource taken parametrically and the number of battleﬁelds determined
by the endogenous choices in the ﬁrst stage. Players are assumed to maximize the expected
proportion of the battleﬁelds won, net of their costs of battleﬁeld expansion.
Our focus is on the case where players are asymmetrically endowed: that is, asymmetric
warfare. In the context of our two-stage game, we demonstrate that — given a suﬃciently
small cost of adding battleﬁelds — for either a suﬃciently small initial number of battle-
ﬁelds or suﬃciently asymmetric endowments of the resource, the weak player chooses to add
18battleﬁelds in any subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast, the strong player, never adds
battleﬁelds. We therefore provide a model of the endogeneity of the number of battleﬁelds,
or the dimensionality of the conﬂict.
The basic force at work in our model is one that, to our knowledge, has not been modeled
elsewhere: In asymmetric conﬂicts, by forcing the strong player to spread his resources more
thinly, the weak player increases the incidence of favorable mismatches, in which the weak
player, despite his overall disadvantage, obtains a battleﬁeld-speciﬁc advantage.
The topic of asymmetric conﬂict has attracted considerable interest since the biblical
story of David and Goliath. Our analysis demonstrates that the possibility of increasing
the number of battleﬁelds through an endogenous process can have a meaningful impact
on outcomes, to the beneﬁt of weaker players. We also believe that this observation has
real-world application in many strategic interactions with multiple components such as war,
sports matches, and business.
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Figure 1: Player W’s stage 2 unique subgame perfect equilibrium expected proportion of
battleﬁelds won
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